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THE SPECIAL POSITION OF MEXICAN BANKS IN THE
EXECUTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FINANCIAL
AGREEMENTS"
LIC. AGUSTIN BERDEJA-PRIETO °' ,
BERDEJA Y ASOCIADOS, S.C., MEXICO CITY; AND
MIKE LUBRANO', ESQ., INTERNATIONAL
FINANCE CORPORATION
Christopher P. Bauman: The next speakers are refugees from the Cleary Gottlieb
firm, which you are quick to learn if you are around them for five minutes or more.
Lic. Agustfn Berdeja-Prieto is someone who I consider to be a very good friend of
mine. He founded Berdeja y Asociados back in 1987, when he was about 21 or 22
years old, right? He also practiced in New York. He is a member of several
organizations. He graduated from the Iberoamericana and also has an L.L.M. from
Harvard.
In addition we have with us Mike Lubrano, who is with International Finance
Corporation. He is Senior Securities Market Specialist in the Financial Markets
Advisory Department. The International Finance Corporation is the private sector
investment affiliate of the World Bank. He has worked both in New York and in
Mexico City with very prominent law firms. He publishes frequently. He has
degrees from Princeton, NYU and Harvard. Messrs. Berdeja and Lubrano will
speak to us this afternoon on the role of Mexican banks in the execution and
enforcement of financial agreements.
BERDEJA: Before we begin, Mike and I will comment on two items that
Michell Nader discussed.' We will have the benefit of Michell sharing our panel
later on. Mike wanted to comment specifically on the impact and convenience of
the banking and securities commissions having been merged, and he has some views
that he wants to share with you about that.
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I personally was interested in your comment, Michell, on banks having to prepare
a study for each disbursement before they agreed to lend money. The reason I have
an interest in that is that it was part of my presentation. It is interesting that you
think that this provision, and I will read it now for the audience, does not provide
borrowers rights even if banks do not comply with their obligation in every case,
under Article 65 of the banking law. My translation, and it is a literal translation
of this article, is the following:
Article 65 of the Banking Law:
Before the granting of financing, banks shall estimate the economic viability of
each investment project, the term for repayment thereof, the relationship
between the various concepts in the borrower's financial statements or economic
conditions, and the moral and managerial qualifications of the borrower without
prejudice of the guarantees which may be necessary, as the case may be. The
amounts, terms, repayment regime and, as the case may be, grace period of each
financing shall maintain an adequate relationship with the nature of the
investment project and with the present and foreseeable conditions of the
borrower. The National Banking and Securities Commission shall ensure that
banks duly observe the provisions of this Article.
Now, one, this Article states the need for better credit analysis by banks and I
will talk about that extensively during my presentation; but, two, I wanted to
comment that I do think that a borrower might use this in a case where a bank did
not prepare the study to give the bank a hard time from a legal point of view.
Further, I am aware of at least one circuit court decision confirming this, which is
one of the issues the Supreme Court of Justice will decide very soon. We can talk
about it later but I didn't want to leave out it here because I might forget it.
LUBRANO: Agustfn and I thought that since I am not a Mexican lawyer, it
would not be appropriate for me to discuss the special legal position of Mexican
banks. However, because I have been working on the Mexican financial system and
particularly have been using my observations on it in recent work that the World
Bank and the International Finance Corporation are doing in Southeast Asia, it
might be useful for me to give a little background on the basic characteristics of the
Mexican financial system, with special emphasis on the shape of the banking sector.
When I end I would like to reflect on the question asked earlier on the merger of
the Securities Commission with the Banking Commission. It is an issue that strikes
near and dear to our hearts at IEFC because we are extensive investors in the
financial sector in Mexico. We have invested in banks, we have equity positions
both in banks, non-bank financial institutions and a lot of industrial companies as
well whose securities either are or, hopefully, one day will be listed on the
exchange. One of the principal roles of my department at IFC, which is now called
the Financial Markets Advisory Department, is advising on capital markets
development, particularly the development of securities markets. The events that
have occurred in the last few years with respect to the merger of the two commissions have been of special interest to us.
I would like to begin by first discussing the size of the Mexican financial system
and in particular the banking system. I think it is important for folks to keep in
mind, whether they be from Mexico or the U.S., particularly if they are from an
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OECD country other than Mexico (and Mexico is an OECD country), that Mexico's
financial system is very small compared to its sister countries in the OECD. There
is a little chart that I have put in the book behind my notes and you will see that
Mexico's loans to GDP ratio is about 1/3 of GDP. A low loans-to-GDP is common
in most Latin American countries, but not all. For example, the numbers in Chile
are much higher. The presence of non-bank debt is higher in a number of countries.
Colombia in particular has an asset-backed securities mortgage market which
Mexico, before the crisis, was only beginning to develop. The comparisons with
Southeast Asia are very dramatic. Assets of the banking sector at the time of the
collapse of the Thai economy in the summer of 1997 was about 165% of GDP. In
Mexico you get to 150% of GDP if you count the government debt and that is still
smaller than the credits of just the Thai banking system. Thailand, incidentally, has
a per capital GDP roughly the same as Mexico, of course depending on exchange
rates.
The ratio you will see in the chart (Annex 1) for the U.S. is a little misleading
because banks are not the largest form of credit because of the presence of the
commercial bond market. The private sector debt market is very large and term
debt is very large in the United States. And on top of it you must add the U.S.
government's debt market, which is very large. Mexico remains a bank-dominated
system, notwithstanding the important roles that the brokerage community served
during the time of bank nationalization, largely as a substitute for bank lending to
large companies by developing the commercial paper market, and notwithstanding
the emergence just before the crisis of a number of non-bank financial institutions
like factoring and special purpose banking and mortgage banking, a number of
industries in which IFC has invested heavily. The private sector debt component
of the Mexican financial system is dramatically concentrated in the banks - 75%.
You count into that as well the development banks which largely lend through the
commercial banks.
Mexico historically has had a concentrated banking system. Besides Citibank,
there were no foreign banks in Mexico until NAFTA. And in 1994 when the
foreign banks were permitted to enter, they were just in the process of being
licensed and getting up operations when the crisis hit. Of course many of them had
no intention of becoming large banks; their business plans were that they would
remain quite small.
Within the system I note in my paper the four largest banking institutions,
Banamex, Bancomer, Serfm and Bital together represent 2/3 of the system's assets.
Concentrated banking systems are not uncommon; in fact the U.S. system is the
exception in having over 10,000 banks and no single bank representing any major
percentage of the deposits or assets in the banking system. Canada, for example, has
a very small number of banks, really about a dozen and the largest contribute or
have among them the vast bulk of the assets. In Mexico the largest two banks
traditionally each represent 20-25% of the banking sector.
The deposit base in Mexico is very different than that in most of the rest of the
OECD, and also different from a number of developing countries. I would say that
in Southeast Asia, generally considered high saving economies, you find a dramatic
difference. The deposit base of the Mexican banks is largely super-jumbo deposits.
We do not have, and the Mexican government has not made public, statistics on the
deposit base available in the last couple of years. But the.statistics that are available
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indicate that over 60% of the funding was in deposits of over U.S. $250,000. That
was the top decile for which the government provided data. We do not have data
broken down by deposits larger than U.S. $250,000.00, but evidence would indicate
that most of that 60% is probably in deposits of well over US $1 million. This
should not be that surprising, when you think that Mexico has long had a deposit
guarantee scheme which implicitly guarantees the full amount of any
unsubordinated debt of a bank. So the incentive to diversify among banks in a
country where you have some sort of limits like, say, the $100,000 limit that the
FDIC insurance limit covers, is not there. I would also note that Mexican banks'
funding is traditionally short-term, and gets shorter term after each bout of market
instability.
Lending products in Mexico are, however, broader than the deposit base.
Mexico has a substantial variety of consumer lending. Particularly after the
privatization of the banks, there was a boom of credit card, mortgage and vehicle
lending as well as a greater variety of instruments for business. As we will discuss
in the panel later today, the shortcomings with respect to the legal framework for
secured transactions and lending against receivables, equipment and inventories
constrain the kinds of lending products that can be offered. We would argue, and
have argued in the work that the World Bank has done, that such shortcoming have
been both cause and effect of a concentration of lending to the largest companies
in Mexico, which has constrained the development of small and medium enterprise
and has macro-economic effects.
If you go to a Mexican city, you will see that there are branches of major
Mexican banks all over the place. That is probably to be desired; particularly the
mini-branches that are set up in supermarkets. These bring banks close to the
public. However, you do not see this branching phenomenon outside the major
cities. Fortunately, Mexico is a highly urban country. But if you actually track, as
the World Bank has, the amount of municipalities that do not have a single banking
institution in Mexico, it is still the majority. So the majority of the surface area of
Mexico is uncovered by bank branches, although the majority of the population is.
Lots of explanations have been given over time as to why the Mexican banking
system has its unique character. I do not pretend that the list that I am about to give
is either completely accurate or comprehensive, but I want to throw these things out
because I think they will be useful for our panel this afternoon.
I have on my list among macro-economic and structural factors that Mexico has
a low savings rate, has had one for a long time, and it has been declining. In recent
years just since the crisis, the total savings of the economy has increased, but that
is a result of the crisis, basically to pay for the damages. Income distributionin
Mexico is poor, relative to OECD countries. The large bulk of the population is
probably not at income levels to engage in substantial financial savings.
Statism and taxation. Anyone who represents a Mexican employer knows that
they complain constantly about how their salary payments, the actual cash that is
handed over to the employees, represents only a small portion of the amount that the
employer pays. Those go through systems like INFONAVIT (the state-owned
housing institute) that basically convert what might otherwise be private savings
into public savings. Many of those public savings are put to less than perfect uses,
and I think INFONAVIT is an example. The recent pension reforms which
privatize the management of pension savings are a step in the right direction, but we
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still have to see how they perform, and the amount of money that goes into them is
probably at this point still inadequate to support the kind of benefits that will be
expected when the current generation retires.
Limitedforeign competition. Until 1994 foreign banks were excluded. Generally
when foreign banks are excluded, you would expect innovation to be impeded,
particularly since, as Luis Martinez rightly noted, there was a lost decade in banking
during nationalization. So the Mexican banking system was probably much in need
of innovation and improved technology in 1991 and 1992 when the banks were reprivatized. We could also have a discussion about whether the foreign banks that
have entered have in fact added anything. Plenty of times we find that foreign banks
keep the better technology at home and they do not provide as much of it to the
investee as we initially expect.
Corporatesectorfactors. Some of them will mirror factors discussed in other
areas. A lot of these things overlap, but have to be categorized under one or another
because of the linearity of writing a paper.
Concentrationof industry and limited domestic competition - I think it is clear
that Mexico's industry is very concentrated. The presence of groups and also the
long periods of state ownership have reinforced that.
The role of multinationals. Large parts of the Mexican economy are controlled
by multinationals or are parts of the multinational production chain. Maquiladoras
are, I suppose, the classic example. That provides a funding source from outside
the country which means that they do not necessarily have to depend on the
domestic banking system for financing, or participate in the financial system at all.
The presence of Mexican companies abroad. A number of very important
Mexican companies do operate abroad. For example, some companies that produce
primarily for export do not finance in pesos at all. The last time I met with a chief
financial officer of a major exporter, he told me they had no exposure at the
holding company level to peso financing. They basically can access the U.S. and
international capital markets.
Bank-corporateaffiliations. This one is very common in the countries that IFC
works in, but in Mexico the issue has become particularly highlighted in the fight
over what to do about FOBAPROA. In fact, the people who purchased the
privatized banks in many cases were the principal investors of industrial groups and,
in fact, were favored by the government for that reason. When the first FOBRAPOA
assistance was provided to Banca Serfin, the Mexican government and the Banking
Commission publically defended the decision on the grounds that Serfin would
survive and the shareholders of Serfin would eventually be able to come up with
additional money that would be needed in the long term to save the bank because
they were a substantial owner of Mexican industry. In the case of Serfin, VITRO
was the principal industrial jewel of the controlling group. While ownership of
banks by industrial groups may provide deep pockets for recapitalization, it also
creates unavoidable conflicts of interest.
We have recently published a review of IFC investments in the financial sector,
and one of the quotes we included was the question asked of Willie Sutton, the
famous U.S. bank robber, "Why do you rob banks, Mr. Sutton?" and he answered,
"Because that's where the money is." If someone were to ask why a glass company
would purchase a bank, one of the reasons is because that is where the money is.
The resources of the bank can be used within the limits of the law, or outside it, to
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finance the industrial operation directly or to finance other companies affiliated by
ownership or by their stage in the industrial chain.
Proximity to the USA is something that I do not think you can avoid looking at
when you look at the characters and problems of the Mexican financial system. No
developing country has a relationship with a single outside OECD industrial country
in the way Mexico has. The relationship is absolutely unique. Mexican savers have
very ready access to the U.S. financial system. Many have bank accounts in the
United States. On a personal note, when I was in Mexico City and paid my
landlady, the check would always come back with a stamp on the back from a San
Diego bank. The ubiquitousness in Mexico of cash machines means that you can
deposit your money in a U.S. bank account and take out cash in pesos any time you
want in Mexico City, or at least any time the system is not down.
We have anecdotal evidence that it is not an uncommon practice among the
substantial migrant community in the United States to deposit their earnings in their
bank accounts in the U.S. and use these as a way to transfer cash from the U.S. to
Mexico - you give your brother a card and he can take money out in Mexico City.
We have no way of tracking this phenomenon - I take out money in Mexico City
on my bank card, no one can tell whether I am a U.S. citizen on vacation or on
business, or whether I am a Mexican using it to help my mom back home pay the
bills.
Finally, some historicalnotes to mention. The nationalization period that was
discussed before (I do not have to go into too much detail) basically meant that
there was no banking being done in Mexico for much of the 1980s. By 1986 or
1987, which was probably the worst, or 1988, most of the assets of the banking
system were government debt. They were being used to finance the government
deficit. So the credit culture had evaporated among bank employees who make
loans, who should follow the manuals, do the kind of analysis to make loans based
on the feasibility of the project, the expected cash flow and the probability of
repayment, separate from the guarantees that Agustin just recited from Article 65.
In fact, as we quickly realized after the 1994-5 debacle, even much of the habit of
papering loans was lost as well.
There have been periodic bouts of real losses on deposits in Mexico, principally
at the times of major devaluations. So folks who can keep their money in assets that
are not in danger of losing maybe 25% of its value overnight, try to do so.
I have on this list the Mexdollar debacle that Agustin reminded me of. Mexican
banks can now offer dollar denominated deposits, and you would think people
might use them to protect themselves from devaluations. But the experience in
1982 when the Mexdollars were actually frozen leads people to believe that
Mexdollars are not as good as dollar dollars in U.S. banks outside Mexico.
Legal regulatoryissues. The special position of Mexican banks as creditors is
going to be the focus of Agustin's remarks so I will not get into those. The
limitations on collateral will be discussed later this afternoon, that is, secured
lending particularly against inchoate assets and movable goods as well as the
aforestated registries, and difficulties of enforcement. The asset-backed market has
been very slow to develop and that has limited the ability of banks to get assets off
their books and do new lending.

Spring 19991

THE SPECIAL POSITION OF MEXICAN BANKS

Transparency in accounting and auditing. To develop a reputation for
transparency takes a long time and to lose it can happen overnight. Southeast Asia
is an example of that.
Finally, the unlimited guaranteeof deposits has led to, most analysts feel, a lack
of market discipline on the banking sector. If you were to look at the spread
between the best and the worst Mexican banks in the inter-bank market historically,
you see it is very narrow, even though you know some banks are in much better
shape than others. That is basically because the government stands behind them all,
and that has led to less of a shaking out of bad banks than you would expect in a
more market-structured system.
I wanted to mention this aside, so please pardon me for this; my formal
presentation is over. The plan that we understood at the World Bank in 1994 for the
merger of the two commissions made a lot of sense. That was, as Michell very
correctly said, if you have a system where the major banks are affiliated with major
brokerage houses, consolidated supervision is very difficult if you have separate
people doing it. It would be a good idea to try to coordinate that to prevent
duplication, and we are all for that.
But the plan that was presented, at least informally, was that supervision of the
intermediaries would merge, but the supervision of the market- that is the behavior
in the securities market, and the supervision of issuers in the securities market would be spun off into a more or less independent SEC (Securities and Exchange
Commission). That made a lot of sense because the specialized nature of
supervision of stock exchanges, over-the-counter markets, that sort of thing, is very
different from what a bank regulator does. In particular, there is a negative
incentive. A bank regulator in a situation where the banks are going to hell in a
handbasket is going to have an incentive to allow the securities market to be used
to hide some of that or to allow unreasonable activities to rob securities investors
of assets because the government does not stand behind those assets, whereas it
does stand behind the bank deposits either explicitly or implicitly. So we usually
are strong advocates of independence in the behavioral aspects of securities - the
market supervision being in a separate entity, people who are clearly responsible for
that and not responsible for whether the banks are solvent.
So the first stage took place, the merger of the two commissions. It is generous,
I think, and again I am speaking for myself and not the institution, it is generous to
say it was a merger. It was more in the actual physical nature of a hostile takeover,
because if you look at the people who quit after the merger, they are mostly on the
securities side. Mexico lost a lot of its institutional memory and skills when that
merger took place. But the development of the next stage, which should probably
have happened simultaneously - of the independent securities commission - never
took place. We are still waiting for it. Maybe this sad situation has spurred in some
ways greater self-regulation by the securities exchange, and that should always be
the first defense for good, clean and efficient market, but you still need an
experienced supervisor behind it. Thank you very much, and I will pass to Agustfn.
BERDEJA: Thank you, Mike
The banking system in Mexico is in very dire straits. Who is responsible for it?
I think if you ask ten different people, you'll get ten different answers. Not that one
is right and the others wrong or anything like that. It is just that we are all affected
by this new mess, and I think that we are all co-responsible. There are some
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common notions going on here. For instance, we need more supervision from the
authorities. I would not say more, but maybe better. We need a better legal system;
we need to revamp the legal system. I would not agree to that extent. I think the
bankruptcy code needs some amendments, especially in the procedural area, but that
is not the solution in my view. So what is missing? I will not elaborate on that. I
have seen Fernando Montes' piece in the binder and it is a very good one and he
discusses many of the problems in this area.
The point that I am trying to make, and you will see once I finish, is that there is
no good substitute for good credit analysis - nothing. Of course, the legal system
has to do with it; of course, a better economy would benefit every bank; of course,
better supervision would improve conditions of the Mexican banks. But nothing,
nothing can replace good sound credit analysis.
My chart (Annex 3) compares the rights of ordinary creditors or corporations
versus the rights of Mexican banks under the Mexican legal system. Keep in mind,
though, that when I say ordinary corporations, I am also including foreign banks.
Foreign banks which are not operating in Mexico as a multiple banking institution
the way that other foreign affiliates are, are not treated by the law as multiple banks
or regular commercial banks. I can call them just banks for purposes of our talk.
There is a reference to affiliates of foreign banks in Article 45 of the law,
Section D, and it compares them or gives them the treatment of multiple banks. But
nothing in the law, and I do not think there would be a good rationale to substantiate
an argument that foreign banks (not incorporated in Mexico) would have access to
the benefits provided by the banking law to actual Mexican banks or affiliates of
foreign banks operating in Mexico. So, with that caveat, let us see what advantages
Mexican banks (some of them, of course) have in the execution and perfection of
credit contracts.
One, the trust arrangement is by now very common and very much preferred for
a variety of reasons as a way of securing transactions in Mexico. Who can act as
a trustee in these arrangements? Only banks. And, since 1993, brokerage houses,
insurance companies and bonding companies, which means along the lines of what
Mike was saying where we have a system of financial groups which is actually
controlled by banks. Banks continue to have that monopoly. This gives banks a
great advantage in the perfection of their own guarantees. In the old days up until
approximately 1996, no bank could create a trust to guarantee obligations of a
borrower to that bank; it had to be a third bank. I think that the big banks realized
that there was a lot of business that they were losing because of this, and now the
law allows them to create their own trust agreements for obligations of borrowers
to themselves. So that is one big advantage.
Of course those of you who are familiar with the civil law system know that we
have this principle of free will, or autonomy of will, whereby you can create
basically any kind of legal document provided you do not violate any legal
provision or the public order. Therefore, one argument that can be made against
what I am saying is that even though something is not regulated in favor of an
ordinary creditor, you can create the instrument. I would say yes, but you would not
necessarily have access to the same procedural advantages provided for banks who
are riding on the back of a specific provision or a specific statute.
That having been said, we have industrial mortgages, another figure. The
industrial mortgage is available to banks only, as per Article 67 of the Banking Law.
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What is nice about an industrial mortgage is that, by law, it says that all of the
mortgager's assets are being given as collateral in favor of the bank. One could
again argue that if you create a mortgage in favor of a foreign creditor, and you
provide for the specific language, you could actually come up with the same result.
That is partially true, again. If you forget anything, though, you will see that you
did not have an industrial mortgage and in trying to enforce your rights, you are just
a mortgage creditor, you are not an industrial mortgage creditor. For example, a
regular mortgage has certain limitations. Under Article 2895 of the Civil Code, a
regular mortgage can only encompass assets which are specifically determined,
whereas the industrial mortgage basically says "every present and future asset will
be part of the mortgage". Again, one more advantage for regular banks in Mexico.
Those are only two examples in the area of perfection or execution of credit
contracts.
If we look at enforcement of credit contracts and credit in general, banks now
have the advantage of being able to bring an executory action. For those of you
who are not familiar with or well aware of what this means, basically it means that
you can attach assets pre-judgment and the proceedings are designed to be summary
versus ordinary commercial proceedings, which may take many years. So banks can
provide a statement of account signed by their own in-house accountant, and this
suffices to give them access to the executory action. The contract is an executory
instrument, no matter what. That is a great advantage of course, and one that has
been challenged as violating due process of law in more than one instance, but thus
far we have not seen the courts willing to agree on that because they say that if the
bank is providing a statement of account and, yes, it gives them the executory
action, the borrower can also contest that and therefore is not being deprived of any
property, and therefore there is no due process violation. That is the status of this
privilege, if I can call it that.
We all suffer, and have suffered for many years, problems in proving personality
or legal capacity to act on behalf of a corporation. Banks do not have to go through
that. According to Article 90 of the Banking Law, an appointment certification
issued by the Board of Directors' Secretary suffices to evidence the authority of the
bank officers. This possibility is not available to ordinary corporations. Here I will
make a stop. In some instances, you can understand advantages that banks have
over ordinary corporations. This is not one of them. If this system is a fair system
where the Secretary of the Board can provide a certificate and that is enough to
evidence your capacity, we should allow this for ordinary corporations, I think.
There is no difference in this respect, and no reason to give banks the advantage.
We have another advantage in this area for banks. You know that Article 2554
of the Civil Code has sort of three degrees of authority for attorneys in fact. One
would be the basic lawsuits and collections, then acts of administration, and finally,
acts of dominion as we call them (acts of ownership). If you want to give
somebody the power to issue or subscribe or guarantee a negotiable instrument, you
have to go to the Negotiable Instruments Law, Article 9, and say that you are giving
them powers under Article 9 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. It is not that it is
difficult, but you have to be aware of that. Otherwise, you might find out that your
borrower's representative had no authority to do it. Well, as per the Banking Law,
any power of attorney granted under Article 2554, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Civil
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Code are deemed to include powers to issue and guarantee negotiable instruments,
so there is another, perhaps unwarranted, advantage.
Another is in the area of execution and enforcement of a pledge. In the context
of a breach of a contract and you are trying to enforce your pledge, if you are a
regular creditor, an ordinary corporation, you have to apply to a judge for
enforcement of your pledge. You want to get the assets sold and then you want to
get access to the money. However, the banks can sell the pledged assets via two
merchants or one commercial public registrar of the locality, and they can further
apply the money immediately and set off the money from the sale of the pledged
assets to the outstanding amount of their credits. Again, while I understand that this
expedited process is desirable, I see no difference with any ordinary creditor who
has a pledge. I think they should also enjoy the same privilege, and not be treated
under a system which is very old and impractical, as has been said throughout the
day.
More importantly perhaps, in the context of bankruptcy proceedings, if an
ordinary creditor has a pledge of assets of the bankrupt company, those assets are
part of the bankrupt's estate and you will have to prove that he had the rights over
that pledge and he will be treated as a creditor with a special privilege, or (creditor
con privilegio especial) under Article 264 of the Bankruptcy Code, fair and square.
Now when it comes to a bank, the bank does not even have to go through that
ordeal; the bank has access to an action to exclude the pledged assets from the
bankrupt's estate. Again, and this is under Article 159, VI, d of the Bankruptcy
Code. If the system for banks is a fair one here, I think it ought to be fair for any
ordinary corporation; there is no reason to distinguish here between the rights of a
Mexican bank, the rights of a foreign bank, the rights of a Mexican ordinary
corporation.
Another advantage they have, which I touched on a little bit Ago, is the following,
Article 1391 of the Commerce Code lists documents which have executory action
for an ordinary corporation. Whereas for banks, provided they executed their
agreement under Article 68 of the Banking Law, anything they sign gives them
access to the executory action. Again, here, it can be argued that banks will be
more fair or that they are more knowledgeable of the circumstances of what they are
doing than a regular ordinary corporation or a foreign creditor. This is again an area
where I think it can be argued that any ordinary corporation or a foreign bank
should have access to the same right.
Now this one is very interesting. Ordinary corporations, in requesting suspension
of proceedings in the context of an amparo suit, have to provide a guarantee for
third party losses and damages. This is very important; we are talking about the
amparo suit or amparo proceedings, which always concern constitutional
violations. If an ordinary corporation wants the judge to restrain somebody from
doing something until the matter is adjudged, they have to provide a bond or some
kind of guarantee to insure that if they do not succeed in their effort and there are
losses or damages to a third party, the third party will have access to quick money
for those losses and damages. This is very fair and I can understand it. Banks,
however, under Article 173 of the Amparo Law are presumed solvent. And today,
all the more, to think that banks are solvent vis-a-vis CEMEX or even VITRO or
many other Mexican corporations is just an illusion LUBRANO: A heroic presumption.
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BERDEJA: Right, a heroic presumption. And, frankly, it is unfair in this case
in my view to give them access to this presumed solvency. What happens is that
they can go and try to do anything they want in trying to get a suspension from an
amparojudge, however outrageous, because there is no cost attached to it. So it
encourages inefficiencies and also unfairness. Even worse, in litigating with the
government in tax proceedings, they also enjoy this advantage even if they are being
questioned by the Ministry of Finance on the way they treated depreciation of
assets, just to give you an example. They do not have to post any bond. We all fear
tax audits and we fear the tax authorities. Banks do not have to deal with this.
They can go through the process knowing they will not have to post any guarantees
even for unpaid taxes.
One final privilege which may be very subtle in terms of the language but has a
great and important weight is this. Ordinary corporations are responsible for the
acts of their employees in general. The principle, which is established in
Article 321 of the Commerce Code, says that principals are responsible for all
operations entrusted to their employees. That is fair again; that is understandable.
In the case of banks, though, the language in the law, and this is Article 91 of the
Banking Law, is that banks are responsible for the acts of their officers and
employees "in the exercise of their functions." You can see the difference, as
lawyers, between "all operations entrusted to the employees" and "in the exercise
of their functions".
We have seen a case recently where a man showed up at a Mexican bank and
tried to collect on a letter of credit. He delivered all the papers there, got the seals,
and was told to come back in three days. Three days later he came back and found
out that the officer he had dealt with had left the bank. So he tried to see other
people, and then he was told that actually the officer had been stealing money from
the bank and was on the run. He said, "I delivered the papers right on time and now
you are telling me that I am late. However, here is the seal of the bank, the
signature of your officer, and I brought the papers before the expiration of the term
for presentment of the letter of credit. What do you want to do about it?" And the
bank officer said, no surprise, "He was not exercising his functions." (It remains
to be seen what scope the Mexican Courts will give Article 91 of the Banking Law.)
So you can see that Mexican banks enjoy a lot of special privileges under the
current legal system and, yet, they are in very dire straits. In many cases as I have
said during my presentation, I can very well understand that they enjoy these
privileges. In others, I think that they should enjoy the same privileges as other
creditors. But in general, I am going back to the same principle I started with. No
matter what we do with the legal system, if we do not try to strengthen our capacity
for rigorous, sound credit risk analysis, this will be just a cyclic problem, a systemic
problem and we will not see the light of day in the Mexican banking system for
centuries to come. Thank you.

U.S.-MEXICO LAW JOURNAL

(Vol. 7

ANNEX 1
SOME BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MEXICAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM
Mike Lubrano
Size. Mexico's financial system is relatively small relative to the country's GDP,
notwithstanding a burst of growth in the banking system from 1991-1994. Total
financial assets, including bank loans, corporate securities and obligations of the
government amount to approximately 1.5 time GDP. However, much of this is
government securities. Outstanding credits of the banking system amount to only
approximately one-third of GDP, which is about average within Latin America, but
significantly less that what generally prevails in other OECD members and in
Southeast Asia.
Intemediaries. Mexico's financial system remains a bank-dominated system.
Notwithstanding the important role played by the brokerage houses during the
period of nationalization in the 1980s and the emergence of non-bank financial
services such as leasing, factoring and mortgage banking in the 1990s, commercial
banks still represent most of the assets of the financial system. Notably, the mutual
fund industry, the insurance industry and the private pension industry remain small,
leaving the system with out a strong institutional investor base. Non-bank financial
institutions, such as leasing companies, that were not affiliated with banks were
decimated by the 1995 crisis and have not recovered.
Structure of Banking Industry. Mexico has historically had a concentrated
banking system. The entry of foreign banks since 1994 has not significantly
changed the overall concentration of the system, since the major foreign players
have expanded by purchasing the assets of troubled institutions. Accordingly, the
four largest institutions (Banamnex, Bancomer, Serfin and Bital) represent two-thirds
of the system's assets. A handful of domestic and foreign controlled banks, each
with five percent or less of the system's assets, represent the bulk of the remainder.
Deposit Base. The Mexican banking system is generally reliant on very large
deposits and inter-bank credits (both from domestic and foreign sources). Retail
depositors play a smaller role in overall bank funding. The current system for bank
liability protection the Fondo Bancario para la Proteccidn de Ahorros
("FOBAPROA") provides unlimited coverage for unsubordinated obligations of
banks, so large depositors are more secure than if there were a cap on liability
coverage. The most recent information available indicates that over 60% of funding
was in deposits of greater than US$250,000. Most of these deposits are probably in
deposits of the peso equivalent of Over US$1,000,000.
Lending Products. Lending products in Mexico are broader than the deposit
base. Mexico has a substantial variety of consumer lending. Particularly after the
privatization of the banks in 1995, there was a boom of credit card, mortgage and
vehicle lending as well as a greater variety of instruments for business. However,
attractive lending products for small and medium enterprises are more limited.
Commercial loans typically require collateral in the form of real property or
personal guarantees. The shortcomings of the legal/regulatory framework for
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secured transactions severely limit the potential for lending against receivables,
inventories and equipment.
Branches. Mexico's banks have historically concentrated their physical
operations in urban centers. The bulk of bank branches are located in the largest
cities and state capital (Of course, the country is highly urban and this is where the
bulk of savers and customers are located.) Today, most municipalities (largely
rural) remain without banking facilities.
Explanations for Current Situation
A variety of explanations are typically voiced to explain why the Mexican
financial system remains bank-dominated, concentrated and relatively small, while
intermediating a relatively small amount of private savings without greater
penetration in the retail markets. What follows is a no doubt an incomplete list.
Some of the points would more accurately be presented under more than one
heading
Macroeconomic/Structural Factors
" Low savings rate. Mexico's private savings rate is relatively low and has been
declining since the early 1980s. Prior to the current crisis, private savings was
approximately 10% of GDP, public savings approximately 5%. Aggregate
savings has risen sharply but probably only temporarily since 1995 as part of the
macroeconomic adjustment. In recent years since the banking crisis, the total
savings of the economy has increased, but that is a result of the crisis, basically
to pay for the damages.
" Poor income distribution. Mexico's already poor income distribution has
worsened in the past two decades. Middle-class savers have been hard-hit by the
recent crisis. The large bulk of the population is probably not at income levels
to engage in substantial financial savings.
" Statism/Taxation. Mexico's state-run pension, health, unemployment and
housing finance schemes have historically absorbed resources that might
otherwise have been channeled through the private financial markets. The recent
pension reform promises to direct a greater share of such resources to the private
financial markets.
" Limited Foreign Competition (Protectionism). The prohibition on foreigncontrolled banks until 1994 and the subsequent limitations on their participation
in the Mexican market certainly impeded technological innovation, and probably
also constrained the growth of the system.
Corporate Sector Factors:
* Concentration of Industry/Limited Domestic Competition. Mexican industry
experienced a long period of state involvement followed by privatization to a
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relatively small collection of private industrial groups; A large class of mediumsized industries not affiliated with financial groups has been slow to develop.
Role of Multinationals. Important segments of the Mexican economy are
dominated by multi-nationals, whose activities in Mexico can be financed more
cheaply through the parent or directly from U.S. or international sources.
" Presence of Mexican Companies Abroad. Some large Mexican industrial
groups have significant operations abroad, or are largely exporters, which
provides them with greater access to financing through the U.S. and international
markets. Exporters are good clients for dollar capital markets.
" Bank/Corporate Affiliations. Banks often share some degree of common
control with large industrial groups and accordingly channel scarce resources to
these affiliated borrowers.
Proximity to the United States
* Ready Access by Mexican Savers to the U.S. Banking and Financial system.
Mexican savers to protect the real value of savings from the
This permits
periodic threats of devaluation and inflation. In addition, it provides a mechanism
for tax evasion.
" Out-migration. A significant part of the more dynamic lower classes spend a
significant portion of their working (and saving) lives abroad. Mexican residents
outside the U.S. provide relatives with access to options to domestic vehicles.
Historical
" Nationalization. The period of state ownership of banks (1982-1991) undoubtedly held back the development of the system. By 1988/7, the system had
become basically a mechanism for retailing government obligations, with over
66% of the assets of the banks consisting of loans to the government.
" Periodic Bouts of Real Losses on Deposits. Bouts of rapid devaluation and
inflation, notably in 1982, 1986/7 and 1994/5 resulted in real losses to savers,
discouraging deposits, particularly term deposits.
* Mexdollar Debacle. The 1982 freeze of dollar-denominated deposits in Mexican
banks under the government of President Lopez-Portillo highlights the risks that
even dollar-denominated savings through the Mexican financial system are risky.
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Legal/Regulatory Issues
Special Legal Position of Bank Creditors (Focus on Agustin Berdeja's
Remarks)
" Limitations on Collateral. Inadequacies in the legal framework for secured
lending, and the poor state of registries and legal enforcement limit the types of
lending instruments available.
" Slow development of Domestic Asset-Backed Market. Shortcomings in the
legal framework and the absence of institutional investors limits the options of
asset backed schemes to free-up bank capital or provide funding sources for
competing non-bank institutions.
* Transparency/Accounting/Auditing. Relatively low standards for disclosure
and accounting increases the risks of lending to unfamiliar borrowers. Enforcement of existing standards is also problematic.
" Unlimited Guarantee of Deposits. The Mexican governments historic
commitment to stand behind all non-deposit liabilities of banks, and its failure
to correctly price this guarantee, gives banks an important funding cost advantage
and permits reliance on large depositors
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Paul Holden, "Collateral without Consequence: Some Causes and Effects
of Financial Underdevelopment in Latin America"(1 996; The Enterprise
Research Institute for Latin America).

Source:

Chart 1. Ratio of Credit to the Private Sector to
GDP in selected Countries.
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ANNEX 3
ORDINARY CREDITORS VS. BANKS: A BRIEF COMPARISON OF THEIR
LEGAL FRAMEWORK*
CONCEPT

MERCHANTS OR
ORDINARY
CORPORATIONS

Mercantile
Accounting

Accounting obligations of
merchants. Merchants must
keep an accounting system in
compliance with the requirements provided in the Commercial Code (C6digo de
Comercio)
("COCOM"):
identify individual operations and their characteristics, include control and verification systems, have a ledger, etc. [Art. 33 of the
COCOM]

BANKS

The general rulings issued by
the National Banking and
Commission
Securities
(Comisi6n Nacional Bancaria
y de Valores) ("CNBV") will
regulate the accounting practices, the records and the documents relating thereto and
the period of time during
which they have to be kept.
[Arts. 99-102 of the Credit
Institutions Law (Ley de
Instituciones de Crddito)
("LIC")]
Every activity that involves a
change in their assets or liabilities must be registered in
the accounting records on the
day it occurs. [Art. 99 LIC]
The CNBV will establish the
basis for the approval of the
monthly financial statements
and the annual balance sheet,
which shall be audited by an
external auditor appointed by
the Board of Directors. Banks
must report to the CNBV any
irregularity. [Art. 101 LIC]
The CNBV will establish the
rules for the maximum estimate of assets and the minimum estimate of obligations

* Foreign banks are not multiple banks. I am not aware of any current decision granting to foreign banks
or non-bank banks, by analogy or otherwise, the rights multiple banks enjoy under the Banking Law (LC). Frankly,
there seems to be no grounds for this rationale. Actually, the Banking Law only refers to affiliates of foreign banks
operating in Mexico as multiple banks. [Art. 45-A, D]. In this respect, for purposes of my chart the term "ordinary
corporations" would encompass foreign banks and non-bank banks.
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MERCHANTS OR
ORDINARY
CORPORATIONS

BANKS

and liabilities. Prior authorization from the Ministry of
Finance and Public Credit
(Secretarfa de Hacienda y
Cr6dito PNblico) ("SHCP")
and for a period no longer
than five years, banks may
estimate the value of their
assets to be the acquisition
value. [Art. 102 LICI
Commercial
Deposit

There are not exceptions for
332-338
[Arts.
banks.
COCOM]

Special Rules:
In case of death of the deposit
holder, the bank will deliver
to the beneficiaries the correAny
sponding amount.
amount in excess of the limits
established in the LIC will be
distributed in accordance
with applicable ordinary law.
[Art. 56 LICI
Conditions applicable to demand deposits may be modified by the bank (with at least
ten days advance notice).
Whenever the applicable legal requirements concerning
book keeping and customer
information, are complied
with, the bank's accounting
entries will be considered as
prima facie evidence in court.
[Art. 58 LIC]
Savings books will contain
the information required in
the corresponding conditions
and they will be executory
instruments (tftulo ejecutivo)
against the bank without need
of a signature recognition or
any other requirement. [Art.
59 LIC]
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MERCHANTS OR
ORDINARY
CORPORATIONS
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BANKS

In accordance with the limits
provided in section 56,
amounts that have been in
deposit for more than one
year may not be attached.
[Art. 60 LIC]
Interests on instruments without a maturity date must be
concentrated in a global account if they have not been
collected or capitalized during a period of five years.
[Art. 61 LIC]
Statute of
limitations

The most common statute of

Executory

Certain instruments are executory instruments... [Art.
1391 COCOM]
The following are executory
instruments:
-Final judgments and arbitration awards (res judicata).
-Public instruments.
- Judicial confession.
-Bills of exchange, orders of
payment, receipts and promissory notes.
- Insurance policies.
-In the insurance area, decisions issued by experts in
connection with the amount
of damages.
-Invoices, current accounts
and any other commercial
contract recognized as validly executed by the debtor
before the courts. [Art. 1391

Instruments
(Tftulos
Ejecutivos)

limitations for commercial
matters is ten years. [ Art.
1047 COCOM]

COCOM]

As an exception, the statute
of limitations for claims
against commercial and brokerage houses' agents is one
year. [ Art. 1043 COCOM]
-Savings books will be executory instruments against the
bank, without need of a signature recognition or any
other requirement. [Art. 59
LIC]
-Credit contracts or policies
along with the account statements certified by an authorized (in-house) accountant
will be executory instruments
without need of a signature
recognition. The account
statement certified by an authorized (in-house) accountant will be, in certain cases,
considered as prima facie
evidence in court. [Art. 68
LIC]
-Documentary Credit Contracts will be an executory
instrument to demand compliance of the obligations
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CONCEPT

MERCHANTS OR
ORDINARY
CORPORATIONS

BANKS

thereunder. Banks do not take
the risk for the quantity, quality or weight of merchandise.
(Art. 71 LICI
Corporate

Corporations with an illegal

Purposes

corporate purpose or executing illegal acts in a frequent
fashion ("habitually") will be
null and void and if anyone
requires it, they will be immediately liquidated. [Art. 3
LGSM]

Banks can only carry out the
activities described in this
provision and no other activities. [Art. 46 LIC]
They are authorized to invest
in shares of other corporations, except for those shares
issued by the corporations
described in articles 88 and
89. [Art. 75 LIC]
Banks need authorization
from SHCP in order to acquire shares from corporations which provide services
supplementary to their own
services. [Art. 88 LIC]
Prior authorization from
SHCP, banks can invest in
equity of foreign financial
entities.
Prior authorization from
SHCP, banks can also invest
in equity of mutual funds
(sociedades de inversi6n),
mutual fund management
companies (sociedades operadoras de sociedades de inversi6n), retirement funds management companies (administradoras de fondos para el
retiro), and mutual funds specialized in retirement funds.
Likewise, prior authorization
from SHCP banks can invest
in the capital stock of auxiliary credit organizations (organizaciones auxiliares de
cr&Iito) when such organiza-
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CONCEPT

MERCHANTS OR
ORDINARY
CORPORATIONS

(Vol. 7

BANKS

tions do not belong to financial groups, except for brokerage houses (casa de
bolsa), insurance companies
(instituciones de seguros) and
bonding
companies
(instituciones de fianzas).
[Art. 89 LIC]
General
requirements
applicable
to the
incorporation

The corporation's charter
must include:
-Name, nationality and domicile of the shareholders.
-Corporate Purpose, name
and duration.
-

Amount of the corpora-

tion's capital stock and paid
in capital.
- Shareholders' contributions
- Corporate governance rules

-Appointment and powers of
management
-Distribution of profits and
losses
-Legal reserve fund
-Dissolution and liquidation
events
-Number, value and nature of
the shares
-Terms and conditions of
payment of the unpaid portion of the shares.
- Rules applying to the distri-

bution of profits to the
founding shareholders
-Appointment of the statutory auditors
- Powers of the Sharehold-

ers' Meeting [Arts. 6 and 91
of the General Law of Mercantile Corporations (Ley
General de Sociedades
Mercantiles) ("LGSM")]

Banks are corporations incorporated in accordance with
the LGSM but with distinct
characteristics: corporate purpose, unlimited duration,
minimum capital stock, etc.
[Art. 9 LIC]
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CONCEPT

MERCHANTS OR
ORDINARY
CORPORATIONS

Amount of the

One fifth of the corporation's capital stock [Art. 20
LOSM]

Banks have to allocate at
least 10 % of their net profits
to the legal reserve fund until
the amount of such fund is
equivalent to the full amount
of the paid-in capital. [Art.
99-A LICI

-Two shareholders at least
- Capital stock: $50,000
Mex. Cy.
-At least 20% of the value of
each share payable in cash
must be paid in.
-The total consideration of
the shares payable in kind
must be contributed from the
outset [Art. 89 LGSM]

-Minimum capital stock:
equivalent to 0.12% of the
net capital of the totality of
banks [Art. 19 LIC]
-Shares must be fully paid in
cash when they are subscribed and must be deposited in a depository such as
the Institute for the Deposit
of Securities ("Indeval").
[Art. 12 LIC]
Additional requirements:
-The SHCP's authorization
along with the prior opinion
from Mexico's Central Bank
(Banco de M6xico) ("BM")
and the CNBV, are required
to incorporate and operate a
bank. [Art. 8 LIC]
-The request shall include a
general business plan and a
deposit of the 10% of the
minimum capital. [Art. 10
LIC]

There are no special restrictions for the choice of the
corporate name... [Art. 88
LGSM]

Specific provision:
Only banks can include in
their corporate name the following words (in any language): bank, credit, saving,
or trustee. Otherwise, a fine
will be imposed and the company will be closed. [Arts.
105 and 107 LIC]

legal reserve fund

Requirements for
the incorporation
of corporations

Corporate Name

BANKS
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CONCEPT

MERCHANTS OR
ORDINARY
CORPORATIONS

Minimum capital

A minimum fixed capital
stock must be maintained by
variable capital corporations.
[Art. 217 LGSM]

A net minimum capital stock
is required for banks [Art. 50
LIC]

Capital Stock
Structure

Shareholders may agree to
divide capital stock in different classes of shares with
special rights for each kind.
[Art. 112 LGSM]

Capital Stock:
-Ordinary part: at least 51%
of Series A shares, the rest
may be Series A or B.
-Additional part: Series L
shares, no more than 49% of
the capital stock [Art. 11 de
la LIC]

Restrictions to the
transference
of
shares

The charter may establish
that the transference of
shares will require the Board
of Directors' prior approval.
[Art. 130 LGSM]

-Series A shares: only Mexican individuals and entities
and institutional investors can
acquire them in addition to
the government. [Art. 13
LIC]
-Series B and L shares: their
acquisition is subject to fewer
restrictions [Art. 14 LIC]
- No one is authorized to hold
more than 5% of Series A
and B shares, except with the
SHCP's prior authorization
and in no event more than
20%. [Art. 17 LIC]
- Indeed, an authorization is
required for any group of persons to acquire control of a
bank, that is, more than 30%,
control of the Shareholders'
Meeting or the power to appoint the majority of the
Board of Directors' members.
[Art. 17 bis LIC]

stock

BANKS
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BANKS

CONCEPT

MERCHANTS OR
ORDINARY
CORPORATIONS

Classes of actions

Shares with limited voting
rights : The charter may establish that certain shares
will have voting rights only
for Extraordinary Shareholders' Meetings where the following items are discussed:
extension of the duration,
early dissolution, change of
the corporation's purpose or
nationality, transformation
and merger of the corporation. [Art. 113]

Series L shares provide voting rights only with respect to
the following issues: change
of the corporation's purpose,
merger, spin-off, transformation, dissolution, liquidation
and cancellation of the registry in any stock exchange
(bolsa de valores). [Art. 12
LIC]

Shareholders'
registry

Corporations must keep a
Shareholders' Book... [Art.
128 LGSM]
A corporation must register
in the Shareholders' Book all
share transfers... [Art. 129
LGSM]

Transfers made in violation
of the law will not be registered. Shares transferred in
violation of this provision
will be sold to the bank at a
price equivalent to 51% of
the lower of their book and
market value. [Art. 18 LIC]

Issuance of new
shares

New shares will be issued
only when all previously issued shares have been fully
paid-in. [Art. 133 LGSM]

All shares must be fully paid
in upon subscription and subat
deposited
sequently
Indeval. [Art. 12 LIC]

Management
of the corporation

The management of the corporation shall be the responsibility of a Board of Directors or a Sole Administrator
[Arts. 142 and 143 LGSM]

The management of the corporation shall be the responsibility of a Board of Directors and a General Director.
[Art. 21 LIC]
The Board of Directors shall
be comprised of 11 members
or a multiple thereof; there
are specific rules for the
Board of Directors' integration. [Art. 22 LIC]
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CONCEPT

MERCHANTS OR
ORDINARY
CORPORATIONS

Powers of
management

The Sole Administrator or
the Board of Directors will
have authority to represent
the Corporation.... [Art. 10
LGSMI

[Vol. 7

BANKS

Specific Provisions:
An appointment certification
issued by the Board of Directors' Secretary will suffice to
evidence the authority of the
Corporation's officers.

The Sole Administrator/
Board of Directors and the The powers of attorney must
managers of a corporation describe only the Board of
are deemed to have powers Directors' resolution to grant
to issue, subscribe, etc... ne- it, the powers granted to the
gotiable instruments [Art. 85 Board of Directors, and the
of the General Law of Nego- appointment of the Directors.
tiable Instruments and Credit The powers of attorney
Transactions (Ley General granted in accordance with
de Tftulos y Operaciones de article 2554, 1st and 2nd
para. shall be construed to
Credito)("LTOC")]
include powers for issuing,
The appointment of the Di- subscribing, etc... negotiable
rectors and managers must instruments. [Art. 90 LIC]
be registered at the Public
Registry of Property and The appointment of the offiCommerce (Registro Pdblico cers and members of the
de la Propiedad y de Board of Directors must be
Comercio) [Art. 153 LGSM] registered in the Public Registry of Property and ComThe acts of their employees merce. [Art. 90 LIC]
will be binding on their principals "for all operations en- In addition to the personal
trusted to those". [Art. 321 civil or criminal responsibility their employees may inCOCOM]
cur, banks are directly responsible for the acts executed by their officers and
employees "in the exercise of
their functions". [Art. 91
LIC]
Appointment
of Directors

Minority shareholders (25%
of the capital stock) are entitled to appoint one member
of the Board of Directors
[Art. 144 LGSM]

Minority shareholders (10%
of the capital stock) are entitled to appoint one member
of the Board of Directors
[Art. 22 LIC]
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CONCEPT

MERCHANTS OR
ORDINARY
CORPORATIONS

Requirements for
being a director or
manager

Those persons who are no
longer legally capable of exercising commerce cannot be
appointed as directors or
managers. [Art. 151 LGSM]

Stricter requirements for be-

Revocation
of
managers
and
Board members

Rules for the removal of
Board members [Art. 155
LGSM]

The CNBV is empowered to
determine, at any moment,
the suspension or removal of
the Board of Directors' members, general directors, statutory auditors and officers.

BANKS

ing a member of the Board
[Art. 23 LIC]
Stricter requirements for being a General Manager [Art.
24 LICI

[Art. 25 LIC]
Minority shareholders (25%
of the capital stock) are entitled to appoint one statutory
auditor [Arts. 171 and 144
LGSM]

One statutory auditor must be
appointed by each Series of
shares (A, B, L). [Art. 26
LIC]

Representation at
Shareholders'
Meetings

Representation shall be conferred as set forth in the bylaws or, at least, in writing.
[Art. 192 LGSM]

Representation shall be conferred in formats issued by
the bank for such purpose.
[Art. 16 LIC ]

Merger

No authorization is required.

The SHCP's prior authorization is required along with
the opinion from the BM and
the CNBV. Specific procedures must be observed.

Appointment
of
statutory auditors

(comisarios)

Merger agreements will be
registered at the Public Registry of Property and Commerce and published in the
official gazette of the domicile of the merging companies. Each merging corporation must publish its last balance sheet.
The merger will become effective three months after the
registration date. [Arts. 222226 LGSM]

The SHCP's authorization
and the merger agreements
will be registered at the Public Registry of Property and
Commerce. Merger agreements adopted by the Shareholders' Meetings will be
published in the Federal Register (Diario Oficial de la
Federaci6n) and two daily

[V/ol. 7
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newspapers of wide circulation in the domicile of the
merging companies.
The merger will become effective as of the registration
date. [Art. 27 LIC]
Dissolution
and liquidation

The shareholders shall
appoint the liquidators.
[Arts. 229-249 LGSM]

The dissolution and liquidation procedure will be carried
out in accordance with the
provisions of LGSM and the
Law on Bankruptcy and Suspension of Payments (Ley de
Quiebras y Suspensi6n de
Pagos) ("LQSP"), with certain exceptions. [Art. 29 LIC]
The Credit Institutions and
Auxiliary Organizations Liquidation Trust, known as
FIDELIC, must be appointed
as liquidator or receiver. [Art.
29-I LIC]

Repurchase
agreements

The LTOC regulates repurchase agreements of negotiable instruments (titulos de
cr~lito) in general.
Repurchase agreements must
be executed in writing. [Arts.
259-266 LTOC]

There are specific rules for
the execution of repurchase
agreements.
The LIC applies only to repurchase agreements involving securities (valores).
Repurchase agreements must
be executed in accordance
with general rulings issued by
the BM. [Art. 54 LIC]
Banks may execute repurchase agreements on behalf
of third parties without the
assistance of brokerage
houses when the purpose of
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such agreement is the "correct functioning of the payment system". [Art. 81 LIC]
Subordinated
Bonds

The LTOC regulates the issuance of bonds. [Art. 208
LTOC]
There are specific requirements for the issuance of
convertible bonds. [Arts. 210
bis-228 LTOC]

There are specific requirements for the issuance of subordinated bonds. [Art. 64
LIC]
Subordinated bonds must
comply with the general requirements applicable to
banking bonds.
The BM's authorization is
required for the issuance of
subordinated bonds. [Art. 64
LIC]

Credits

Ordinary corporations are
not required to prepare a
study determining the "economic viability of the investment projects".

Banks must prepare a study
determining the "economic
viability of the investment
projects, the re-payment period thereof", etc. [Art. 65
LIC]

Purchase finance
agreements
(credito de
habilitaci6n o
avfo; cr&iito
refaccionario)

These contracts must be executed by means of a private
contract, signed in three copies before two witnesses and
ratified before the person in
charge of the Public Registry
of Property and Commerce.

Purchase finance agreements
must comply both with the
provisions of the LTOC and
the provisions of the LIC.

A portion of a cr&lito
refaccionario may be applied
to the payment of: (i) tax
debts; and (ii) other debts
incurred in connection with
the purchase and/or exploitation of goods. [Arts. 321-333
LTOC]

These contracts must be executed before a Commercial
Public Registrar (Corredor
Ptiblico), in a notarial deed,
or in a private contract signed
in three copies before two
witnesses and ratified before
a notary public, commercial
public registrar, trial judge or
the person in charge of the
corresponding Public Regis-

[Vol. 7
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try of Property and Commerce.

The portion of the credit to
be applied to the payment of
tax or other debts cannot exceed 50% of the credit. [Art.
66 LIC]
Industrial
Mortgage

Not regulated. Available?

Expressly available and regulated in detail for banks. [Art.
67 LIC]

Commercial
pledge

In general, a pledge may be
created by delivering the asset (possessory security) or
by endorsing the negotiable
instrument, as the case may
be. [Art. 334 LTOC]

A pledge may be created simply by identifying in the
credit document the assets the
subject of the collateral. The
collateral may be realized
with the participation of one
Commercial Public Registrar
or two merchants from the
locality, and banks have the
right to set off the money received from the realization of
the collateral against their
credit. In certain cases, the
pledge can be perfected without delivering the asset. [ Art.
69 LIC]

Commercial
pledge on corporate credits [acreceivcounts
able?] (cr&litos en
libros).

...A pledge on corporate
credits may be created if the
applicable provisions of the
LIC are complied with. [Art.
334-VIII LTOC]

In certain cases, the pledge
can be perfected without delivering the asset. This kind
of pledge can be created by
(i) listing the credits in the
credit agreement; (ii) identifying each account receivable
as "pledged"; and (iii) the
creation of a special registry
by the bank. For purposes of
the collection of the credit,
the debtor is considered as an
agent of the creditor with the
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ensuing civil and criminal
liabilities. [Art. 70 LIC]
Commercial
Procedure

It may be involve litigation
before the courts or arbitration proceedings... [Art.
1051 COCOM]
There is no time-period established to comply with the
terms of the award.
When there is an executory
document the conflicts shall
be resolved by means of a
summary commercial process. [Art. 1391 COCOM]
In the absence of a special
procedure, disputes will be
resolved by means of an ordinary, as opposed to an executory, commercial process.
[Art. 1377 COCOMI

Trust

Ordinary corporations cannot act as trustees. [Arts.
346-359 LTOC]

Any controversy may be resolved by the courts or the
CNBV. A conciliation process is available. The CNBV,
is authorized to fill in legal
deficiencies of any claim.
[Art. 119 LIC]
In case of impossibility of
conciliation, alternative dispute resolution methods will
be suggested an.
The parties must comply the
award within a period of 15
days. [Art. 120 LIC]
When the credit is secured,
the bank is empowered to
pursue a summary, ordinary
or any other commercial process available, and the bank
will keep the collateral and
its preference rights over it
even if the secured assets are
being sought by another creditor in an execution procedure. [Art. 72 LIC]
Specific provisions
Banks must keep separate
accountings records for each
trust arrangement. [Art. 79
LIC]
Banks must carry out trusts
and commission operations
through designated trust
agents. Banks are responsible
for the losses, and damages
caused for the non-compli-

U.S.-MEXICO LAW JOURNAL

CONCEPT

MERCHANTS OR
ORDINARY
CORPORATIONS

[Vol. 7

BANKS

ance of their obligations. A
technical committee may be
established; whenever a bank
acts in accordance with this
committee's instructions, the
bank will be free of any liability. [Art. 80 LIC]
Employees assigned to carry
out trust-related work shall
not be considered as employees of the banks; in the event
of a lawsuit brought by these
employees against the bank
the bank will use the trust
assets to comply with the corresponding judicial decision,
as necessary. [Art. 82 LIC]
Parties to a guaranty trust
indenture are free to agree on
the execution procedures.
Absent such an agreement,
the pledge execution procedures will be applied. Unless
the debtor objects to the execution of pledge-like proceedings, the judge will order
the compliance with the provisions of the trust indenture.
[Art. 83 LIC]
Strikes

In the event of a strike, certain employees must continue working, i. e.: (i) employees of ships, airplanes,
trains, buses which are in
route; and (ii) employees of
hospitals until all patients are
transferred to another health
institution [Art. 466 of the
Federal Labor Law (Ley
Federal del Trabajo)("LFr")

During a strike, the Conciliation and Arbitration Board
(Juntas de Conciliaci6n y
Arbitraje) will order that necessary branches remain open
and those "strictly necessary"
employees remain working.
[Art. 121 LIC]
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Holidays

Eight holidays are established in the LFT. [Art. 74
LFT]

The CNBV will determine
the bank holidays for each
year. If so decided by the
CNBV, bank holidays will
not be considered as working
days for any legal purposes.
[Art. 95 LIC] Bank holidays
for 1998 are 14, including
those under the LFT.

Bonds to guarantee losses and
damages
which
may be caused to
third parties

Legal proceedings shall be
suspended upon the application of the claimant provided
"sufficient guarantee" is furnished by the claimant to
guarantee third-party losses
and damages. [Art. 173 of
the Amparo Law] Tax obligations liquidated by the
government as well as other
tax indebtedness must be
paid or guaranteed. [Arts. 65,
141, 142 of the Fiscal Code
of the Federation (C6digo
Fiscal de la Federaci6n)]

As long as a bank is not involved in bankruptcy or suspension of payments proceedings, it shall be presumed
solvent and shall have no obligation to set up any legal
deposits or bonds, including
those required from other
parties to grant a request for
the suspension in an amparo
law suit or tax obligations in
tax proceedings. [Art. 86
LIC]

Adhesion
contracts

Certain adhesion contracts
must be registered in advance before the Consumer
Protection
Bureau
(Procuradurfa Federal del
Consumidor). [Arts. 86 y 87
of the Federal Consumer
Protection Law (Ley Federal
de
Protecci6n
al
Consumidor)
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